SELF-INTEREST, POLITICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT—A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR SCHROEDER
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN*
A recent book on public choice economics begins by recounting
Pablo Picasso’s observation on his portrait of Gertrude Stein:
“Everybody thinks she is not at all like her picture, but never mind, in
1
the end she will manage to look just like it.” This enigmatic statement can illustrate several important points. It may mean that
Picasso captured the essence of Gertrude Stein so skillfully that, in
the end, the inescapable reality of the portrait will dawn on us. Or, it
may mean that we will be so captivated by Picasso’s unusual way of
looking at things that we begin to look at his subject that way too,
even if, in fact, the portrait is not at all realistic. These competing interpretations make the statement deeply paradoxical, but either way
we appreciate how powerful an influence are the lenses—physical, intellectual, and artistic—through which we see the world. And, perhaps a more cutting conclusion, we appreciate that once drawn to a
lens that we believe “should” be used, the line between what should
be, and what “is,” is blurred forever.
So it is with the Third Cummings Colloquium, “The Rents of
Nature: Special Interests and the Puzzle of Environmental Legislation.” The Colloquium seeks to highlight one particular lens, broadly
speaking the lens of rational-choice economics, through which to
look at federal environmental legislation. And, paraphrasing Picasso,
the Colloquium’s reference to “the Rents of Nature” may mean that,
if we subscribe to the theoretical techniques of rational-choice economics, then environmental law “will manage to look just like it.”
Yet this may not be a good thing. For the Colloquium’s title also
suggests that environmental legislation is a “puzzle” to rational
choice theorists, which should make us cautious before we choose the
rational-choice lens in the first place. Thus, like Picasso’s statement,
the title of this year’s Cummings Colloquium is paradoxical.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Special thanks go to my colleague
Pete Andrews for his typically insightful comments on an earlier draft. All errors, of course,
are my own.
The World-Wide Web version of this article can be found at
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/9DELPFHornstein>.
1. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 1 (1997).
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I read Chris Schroeder’s paper as an attempt to address this
2
paradox. Rather than try to have it both ways, Chris stakes out a
bold proposition: that the major federal statutes adopted between
1969 and 1973, which he calls the Beginning Environmental Statutes
(“BEST”), were “the product of individuals rationally pursuing egoistic preferences” and were not adopted on a reasoned belief that the
policies embodied in them were “best for the country as a whole . . .
3
.” Moreover, for much of his paper, Chris focuses even more starkly
4
only on the importance of “material egoism.”
Chris defines
“material egoism” to exclude “warm glows and psychic enjoyment of
the environment,” and, instead, only to encompass human preferences that directly produce “income or wealth effects” or indirectly
provide “something that can be readily converted to income or
wealth or that substitutes for something that would have to be pur5
chased.”
Although at times Chris seems merely to be playing devil’s ad6
vocate, the thrust of his position is understandable. Chris plainly signals his admiration for the theoretical power underlying Mancur Ol7
son’s Logic of Collective Action and attempts to set forth both a
theoretical and empirical account of the BEST which is consistent
with it. In the main, most of Chris’ paper is offered as a contribution
to the descriptive literature. It is intended to speculate on how the
BEST reflects the workings of rational-choice, rather than deliberative or republican-moment, models of political life.
But I also read Chris’ paper as addressing a normative argument.
The argument arises when we intertwine the descriptive question of
why we have the environmental laws that we do and its inevitable, if
unintended, twin: the normative question of whether we should have
the environmental laws that we do. For if it could be shown that, as
2. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29 (1998).
3. Id. at 43.
4. See id at 40. “It is useful to develop the case for the BEST, however, by first examining the nature of the purely material egoistic account.” Id. at 44-45. See also id. at 56
(reemphasizing “material” preferences).
5. Id. at 40-41.
6. Chris confesses near the conclusion of his paper that he is “someone who believes that
our environmental laws are attempts to advance defensible principles and not just self-interest,
notwithstanding the argument” he makes. Id. at 57. Even when defending his argument in its
most bold form, Chris admits that his rational-choice account is at most a “plausible” story that
is “admittedly incomplete.” Id.
7. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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an historical matter, environmental legislation reflects the selfinterested machinations of special-interest politics rather than an
honest stab at procuring the public good, then we can surely expect
that some will make the normative case that this whole body of leg8
islation is suspect. As I observed in an earlier article, “if either interest group theory or public choice theory is even roughly correct,
with the implication that political outcomes reflect the relative power
of special interests rather than public-regarding deliberation, then
one should immediately question whether environmental policymaking . . . should be anchored so firmly in politics, be they those of
9
Congress or the Executive.”
Chris anticipates and addresses this argument by asking in the
last part of his article, “What’s Wrong With Self-Interested Environ10
mentalism, Anyway?” Here, Chris’ paper raises what I view to be
one of its most valuable contributions. He argues that the selfinterestedness that he believes explains environmental law is nothing
about which to be ashamed and, more to the point, is more consistent
with the overall public good than the selfish economic rents that less
11
careful critics might claim to underlie environmental legislation. In
so arguing, Chris reminds even the most committed non-publicchoice theorist that environmental law is not necessarily at war with
sound economic sense.
We all owe Chris a debt for training his analysis in this piece, and
12
in several previous works, on a seriously understudied question: how
can we account politically for a significant body of legislation that
seems to fly in the face of many leading rational-choice explanations
of politics? As Richard Stewart, another serious scholar of environmental law recently put it:

8. For example, Marc Landy and Mary Hague argue that an “unholy alliance” between
environmental groups and the waste treatment industry has led to a Superfund regime that is
“positively harmful to the environment.” Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for
Waste: Private Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS,
PRIVATE REWARDS 67, 74-81 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
9. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and
Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 406-07 (1993) (citations omitted).
10. Schroeder, supra note 2, at 56-59.
11. See id.
12. Chris has addressed this issue before. See, e.g., Christopher Schroeder, Foreword: A
Decade of Change in Regulating the Chemical Industry, 46(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1983); Christopher H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility
Analysis is the Answer, What is the Question? 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (1990).

64

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 9:61

This still leaves, however, the public choice puzzle of how the
commitments of individuals to environmental protection can be
mobilized to offset the organizational advantages enjoyed by firms,
unions, and other organized economic interests. . . . These questions . . . require far more study. The fact of strong and politically
effective general public demand for federal environmental regula13
tion remains to be fully explained.

The Descriptive Claim—Empirical and Theoretical Problems
Technically speaking, Chris’ solution is largely to model the success of environmental groups as “assurance games” rather than as
14
“prisoner’s dilemmas” (“PDs”). In the conventional, PD account,
polluters should have an easier time organizing politically than environmentalists because polluters are motivated to cooperate to avoid
the concentrated costs of anti-pollution measures that would be imposed on them by environmental legislation. Environmental groups,
in contrast, remain relatively “latent” because self-interested individual members realize that they can enjoy the benefits of anti-pollution
legislation without actually participating in political action. Because
such legislation will clear the air and water for everyone
(environmental protection is a “pure” public good from which the
public at large cannot be excluded), members of the general public
calculate that their optimal course of action is to free-ride on the efforts of others. This free riding is a form of non-cooperative behavior
that, while individually rational, in the end proves disastrous for all—
and hence the grim “logic” of collective action predicts that
15
“environmental groups will remain latent.” Political scientist Elinor
Ostrom has observed that the free-riding at the heart of the collective-action problem is a variation of the temptation to defect that
16
animates the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the economic literature.

13. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 213 (1997).
14. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two prisoners are being interrogated separately. If both
confess, each is sentenced to a prison term of eight years. If neither confesses, each is convicted of a lesser offense and sentenced to a prison term of one year. If just one confesses and
implicates the other, the confessor is released but the other prisoner is sentenced to a prison
term of ten years. The paradox of the problem is that, under these conditions, each prisoner’s
best strategy is to confess, which results in a suboptimal result (two eight-year prison terms) for
both. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 17 (2d ed. 1994).
15. Schroeder, supra note 2, at 35.
16. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 5-7 (1990).
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Enter the “assurance game.” Not all collective-action situations
follow the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In an assurance game,
individual members will contribute to the collective good once they
are assured that all other individual members—or, perhaps, enough
17
other individual members—will also contribute. Chris refers to this
dynamic as the “Ben Franklin Effect,” following Franklin’s advice to
fellow signers of the Declaration of Independence that “we must all
18
hang together or we will assuredly all hang separately.” In the economic literature, this dynamic is illustrated by the “Stag Hunt”
19
game. In the Stag Hunt, a group of hunters must cooperate to capture a stag. All hunters prefer the large stag over smaller quarry such
as hare. If a hare passes by, any one of the hunters may take unilateral action to catch and eat the hare, but in so doing that hunter will
deprive the others of the opportunity of capturing a stag (remember,
it takes the collective efforts of all the hunters to capture the stag).
Hence, the contingent nature of deciding how to coordinate their actions and choose individual strategies: Hunter A will cooperate only
so long as he believes all others will cooperate. But this creates a
chance for collective success. The Stag Hunt offers the possibility of
more hopeful outcomes than are predicted by the grim, PD-inspired
logic of collective action. For if individuals are assured that everyone
else in the group will “hang together,” then they will join in, rather
than shirk, the collective endeavor.
According to Chris, something like the Stag Hunt captures the
dynamic of collective action in the environmental movement during
the formative period, 1969-1973, when the BEST were adopted. For
proof, Chris offers algebra and some general statistical information.
To explain why environmentalists were able credibly to signal legislators that they controlled deliverable, environmental votes, Chris offers this algebraic formula for the public’s willingness to lend electoral support to environmental causes: R = pb - c + d, where R
represents the “reward from voting” for environmental candidates
and therefore the willingness of individuals to lend a hand in the collective political effort; pb represents the likely benefits to be had for
17. See Donald T. Hornstein, The Language of the Nile: Cooperation and Competition in
the Use of Watercourses (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, presented to the
Natural Resources Workshop at Stanford University Law School and to the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, February 24 & 25, 1998).
18. Schroeder, supra note 2, at 48.
19. This account of the Stag Hunt is taken from Hornstein, supra note 17, at 13. See also
Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of
International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 390 (1996).
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voting green, with b representing the concrete individual benefits of
environmental protection, discounted by p, the likelihood that one’s
20
vote will actually be decisive and make a difference. To this calculation of material benefits, individuals will presumably subtract c, the
costs of voting and, we’re told, will also add d, the (non-material)
21
benefits of voting “per se.”
Frankly, I find the algebra a bit distracting. The main focus
should be on how individual environmentalists overcame their free
riding (PD) problems and cooperated in a collective political effort
and, according to Chris’ hypothesis, did so solely due to a calculation
that this was the best way to satisfy their direct, material egoist preferences. Thus, Chris finds it immediately necessary to ignore the d
term, even though he acknowledges that his analysis will be
22
“ultimately less plausible than accounts that include d . . . .” This
leaves pb to represent the material egoist preferences on which Chris’
hypothesis depends. Chris spends several pages, and introduces two
23
additional algebraic equations, trying to build up the sum of these
two variables—a complicated effort that I find somewhat ironic for
someone who so self-consciously wants a “parsimonious,” non-messy
24
explanation.
To simplify things, it really is the p term that deserves most of
our attention. For, however large might be the individual benefits, b,
of a cleaner environment, these benefits will accrue equally to those
who lend a hand to the collective effort and to those who free-ride.
Thus, I find Chris’ discussion on the increased public-health benefits
25
of environmental protection to be somewhat beside the point, at
least if the point is to focus on why individuals cooperate to obtain
this collective good. Chris acknowledges the point when he observes
that, “[i]n terms of the logic of collective action, rising individual
benefits from collective action may or may not produce collective action. . . . So long as the individual believes her contribution is insignificant, even large values for b will not produce individual action to
26
advance collective interests.” Although Chris later speculates on a
possible interaction between b and p which allows “political entre-

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 44.
See id.
Id. at 45.
See id. at 45-51.
Id. at 41.
See id. at 45-47.
Id. at 47.
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27

preneurs” to produce a sum that is larger than the parts, much of
28
Chris’ argument is found in a four-page discussion of the p variable.
The p term is what makes the Stag Hunt so central to Chris’ hypothesis. Recall that people will cooperate in collective action in the
Stag Hunt so long as they are assured that everyone else will also cooperate. In short, when everyone perceives that they are all indispensable, they will “hang together” rather than hang separately. In
Chris’ formula, the p term represents the likelihood that “one’s vote
will actually be decisive and make a difference.” So the question becomes, can we persuasively model the success of environmental
groups circa 1969-1973 as a series of successful Stag Hunts?
Chris’ paper contributes to this question more by the care in
which he frames it rather than any attempt to provide empirical evidence of an answer. There is almost no discussion of individual environmental interest groups and their linkage to the legislative battles
behind the BEST. Chris does not distinguish the organizational
techniques and success of such longstanding groups as the Sierra
Club (founded in 1892), the National Audubon Society (founded in
1905) and the National Parks and Conservation Association (founded
in 1919), and what might be thought of as second-generation groups
such as the Environmental Defense Fund (founded in 1967) and the
29
Natural Resources Defense Council (founded in 1970). Yet even a
little historical inquiry would be extremely helpful. For example, it is
difficult to square the core organizational attractiveness of such longstanding groups as the Sierra Club, which originally organized over
30
aesthetic and recreational interests in wilderness and wildlife, with
the importance Chris sees in public-health issues as a necessary ingredient of organizational success.
Moreover, the historical record of even the second-generation
groups that formed during the BEST period reveals that such groups
owed much of their early success to their use of litigation (rather than
31
political threats of voter reprisals) and to financial sponsorship by
32
external private foundations rather than membership support. Al27. Id. at 50.
28. See id. at 47-50.
29. See Helen M. Ingram et al., Interest Groups and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 115, 118-19 (James P. Lester
ed., 2d ed. 1995) (describing the evolution of environmental interest groups).
30. See id. at 118.
31. See id. at 119 (both EDF and NRDC “used litigation as the instrument of choice for
reform”).
32. See John Mark Hansen, The Political Economy of Group Membership, 79 AM. POL.
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though it is not inconceivable that something like the “Ben Franklin
effect” can explain the success of such group activity in the 1960s and
1970s as civil-rights boycotts and marches in which solidarity was of
33
paramount importance, Chris’ reference to the hundreds of thousands of people who joined national environmental organizations and
the “potential voting bloc . . . of 4 to 5 million individuals” actually
detracts from his point that any individual in such a large group
34
would in fact feel indispensable.
There lurk other empirical issues as well. For example, given
Chris’ Stag Hunt thesis, one would expect that local or state environmental groups would have organized especially effectively. After
all, local environmental issues concern fewer people and, within the
smaller group, each individual member might very well feel indispensable and thus contribute to the collective effort at the state and local
level. Yet it was precisely the failure of the states to come to grips
with environmental problems that led to the federalization of envi35
ronmental law during 1969-1973. Moreover, Chris’ emphasis on the
importance of material, public-health benefits to environmental
group formation is difficult to square directly with popular support
for such non-public-health-oriented BEST statutes as the Wild and
36
Scenic Rivers Act (1968), the Marine Protection, Research and
37
38
Sanctuaries Act (1972), and the Endangered Species Act (1973).
My own study of the politics underlying the 1972 amendments to the
federal pesticide law indicates that popular outrage at the excesses of
the pesticide industry and its governmental supporters, and not any
special change in environmental group dynamics, explains at least
39
some of the legislative activity.
SCI. REV. 79, 94 (1985).
33. In a marvelous empirical study, political scientist Dennis Chong documents how assurance-game models help explain the tactics and organizational success of civil rights groups
during this time period. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1991).
34. Schroeder, supra note 2, at 51.
35. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 882 (2d ed. 1996) (“[I]t is not surprising that the 1965 [Clean Water] Act
produced only slow progress. By 1972 only about one-half of the states had water quality standards . . . .”).
36. See Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1994)).
37. See Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-45
(1994)).
38. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16. U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44
(1994)).
39. See Hornstein, supra note 7, at 422-435. Other explanations also exist for the legislative history of these amendments. See, e.g., Angus MacIntyre, A Court Quietly Rewrote the
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To be sure, there are times when there is nothing more practical
than a good theory. And, perhaps due to the weak historical record,
Chris theorizes that environmental groups succeeded because political entrepreneurs were able to offer “selective incentives” which, in
turn, overcame the tendencies of individual environmentalists to
free-ride. Here, Chris taps into an emerging, and interesting, expla40
nation of group behavior. But the selective incentives to which he
refers threaten to undermine the preference for material ego satisfaction his model is supposed to demonstrate. For, to provide these selective incentives, Chris resorts to the d term in his algebraic equation
41
that he had earlier set aside. This time, however, he asks us to consider the possibility that the d term includes the “positive feelings
[individuals experience] when acting in concert with others whose
42
values they respect and share and whose opinions they value.” Further, Chris argues that these “positive feelings” are produced by political entrepreneurs who create group solidarity by disseminating information about environmental threats, choosing well-defined
courses of action for the group, and creating feelings of “altruism”
43
toward other group members.
Although I think that Chris is on to something by suggesting the
rise of an environmental norm with which people identified and, perhaps, which generated altruistic feelings toward other group members, his resort to the d term certainly signals the collapse of his claim
that it was direct, material egoism that underlay the BEST. Even his
modified claim, one that expands the “permissible range of egoistic
44
preferences beyond material ones alone,” now rests on a chickenegg problem. Which came first, the esteem of well-informed group
45
members that we desire, or a shared sense of political solidarity that
makes us, in the first place, esteem others who hold our views? The
point is not simply that the d term, as Chris redefines it, is tautological, it is rather that the d term may include morally based political
Federal Pesticide Statute: How Prevalent is Judicial Statutory Revision?, 7 L. & POL’Y 249, 25365 (1985) (describing the judicial policymaking that resulted in both minor and “major modifications of both statutorily-defined procedure and substance” of the statute).
40. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1023-29 (1995)
(explaining how selective incentives, such as esteem for one’s peer group, can explain the persistence of inefficient racial discrimination by white southerners).
41. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 45.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at 53-54 & n.63.
44. Id. at 53.
45. See id.
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convictions at odds with Chris’ promise that the collective action
problem would be solved solely by egoism. Thus, I do not necessarily
disagree with Chris that political entrepreneurs can so animate the d
variable that it creates a dynamic strong enough to overcome the
temptation to free-ride. And I may also agree with Chris that environmentalism may be attractive in part because of its ideological re46
lationship to “progressivism and optimism.” The significant point is
that environmental groups become animated for reasons other than
the satisfaction of selfish economic interest, and the public policies
that they support are far more than the narrow economic “rents”
seen by rational-choice theorists. Although this hardly means that all
environmental policies are wise, it does mean that we disagree about
the wisdom of such policies because we all are capable of caring
deeply about public issues per se.
Empirical evidence seems to support this non-economic explanation for the vitality of environmental interest groups. In a study of
such groups, one set of commenters has found:
Evidence from survey research suggests strongly that two elements
are crucial in maintaining membership in environmental organizations: the perceived existence of threats to either one’s own environment or to the general environment of the nation and the appeal of an ideology that corresponds with the concerns of the
individuals to whom appeals for membership are made. Selective
benefits, available only to members, such as opportunities to acquire coffee-table books, participate in sponsored outings, and obtain credit cards, provide substantial income to an organization like
the Sierra Club, but they do not account for the growth and main47
tenance of membership strength.

Moreover, no single explanation can explain the motivating
forces of different environmental groups. Some of the secondgeneration groups, for example, are animated by a belief in science
and “seek to demonstrate expertise through technical mastery of the
48
logic of their positions on toxic substances and air quality.” Other
environmental groups “tend to eschew science and believe their principal role is that of advocacy and publicity. The Sierra Club provided
landmark examples of advocacy with spectacular public relations
campaigns that blocked dams in Dinosaur National Monument in

46. See id. at 55.
47. Ingram et al., supra note 26, at 121.
48. Id. at 126.
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49

1956 and Grand Canyon National Park in 1968.” And a third generation of grassroots environmental organizations has arisen with especially strong morally-based positions on distributional issues of environmental justice or expressive values on citizen participation in
50
decisions that affect their lives. As Lois Gibbs, the well-known
founder of the Citizens’ Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste once
put it, “The Big Ten [environmental organizations] approach is to
ask: What can we support to achieve a legislative victory? Our ap51
proach is to ask: What is morally correct?” Environmental organizations are more diverse than many people realize and reflect a wide
52
spectrum of public ideologies.
Even in such anti-environmental
public movements as the “Wise Use” or “Property Rights” movements, one sees deeply held political views about individual liberty
and not simply a conglomerate of money-oriented political action
committees.
If all this means that Chris has overstated his point, I don’t want
to overstate mine. There is plenty of room for self-interest to operate
within the borders of environmental law and there are plenty of examples of people supporting environmental laws at least in part for
selfish, rather than public-regarding, reasons. The eastern states, for
example, may have supported the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions in part out of a sense of economic competition with western states whose regional development
53
might be relatively disadvantaged by the PSD program. Du Pont
49. Id. at 126-127.
50. See id. at 120-121.
51. WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 214 (1992).
52. Lois Gibbs recounts a revealing moment that occurred at a meeting between grassroots environmental activists and representatives of large, national environmental organizations:
It was hilarious . . . . People from the grassroots were at one end of the room, drinking
Budweiser and smoking, while the environmentalists were at the other end of the
room eating yogurt. We wanted to talk about victim compensation. They wanted to
talk about ten parts per billion benzene and scientific uncertainty. A couple of times,
it was almost war.
Id.
53. Engel writes:
The congressional voting record on the PSD requirements shows that the provisions
were supported by dirty air states that served to lose in the competition for industry in
the absence of such amendments (northeastern and midwestern states), and opposed
by states serving to gain in their absence (southern and western states). This demonstrates that passage of the requirements was at least somewhat motivated by a desire
to eliminate locational competition.
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 294 (1997)(citation omitted).
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may have supported the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) in part because it had a head start on com54
mercializing non-CFC alternatives. The hazardous waste treatment
industry may support stringent toxic waste regulations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in part because
55
strict RCRA regulation sends business its way.
But even these examples hardly color environmental law solely
in the colors of rational choice economics. The eastern states, for example, may genuinely support environmental protection for publichealth or ideological reasons, even if they recognize that there are
selfish economic-development advantages to be had as well. The international agreement reached in 1987 about upper-level stratospheric ozone depletion largely reflected a combination of (1) the
scientific consensus that developed by the mid-1980s about unregulated ozone loss and (2) the value-laden public conclusion that such
losses were unacceptable—and the fact that Du Pont may have realized there were potential profits to be had by “getting with the program” hardly means that the program itself was only a profit-driven
56
figment of Du Pont’s imagination.
In an earlier article, Chris chronicled the roles played by “moral
outrage” and “cool analysis” in the development of environmental
57
law. Although Chris’ point in that article was to contrast these two
ideological traditions of environmentalism, it is equally as important
to recognize how much in common these two traditions share. Both
of these traditions are public-regarding in their nature. They both reflect strongly felt political positions, whether supported by an intuitive sense of right and wrong or a painfully documented record of
scientific conclusions and economic analysis. The real contrast is between these public-regarding traditions and the far-less-legitimate
phenomenon of selfish special-interest politics. Although supporters
of rational choice economic models like to think that they have cor-

54. See, e.g., Du Pont Steps Up Commercialization of Substitutes for Chlorofluorocarbons,
19 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1157 (Oct. 7, 1988).
55. See, e.g., Industry Warns Administration, Congress on Use of Federal Lands for Disposal Sites, 7 Chem. Reg. Rep. 865 (Sept. 30, 1983) (describing how the hazardous waste industry opposes opening up public lands for waste disposal sites because it would hurt the
“‘intensely competitive’ disposal industry”).
56. See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 78-116 (1994) (describing the negotiations leading to the
Montreal Protocol).
57. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (1993).
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nered the market on analysis of political power, in fact the durability
of environmental law may reflect that even a system of government
so heavily influenced by special-interest politics must give way occasionally, and perhaps regularly, to the momentum of public-regarding
ideas. By speaking truth to power, much of environmental law owes
its attractiveness to the power of ideas—whether morally or economically based—whose time has come.

